Dark Box: Abu Dhabi at the Center of the Storm — Sources Reveal UAE Role in Fueling Ethiopia-Eritrea Escalation as Red Sea War Looms
Dark Box — As Ethiopia and Eritrea sever diplomatic relations and military tensions spread across the Horn of Africa, well-informed sources have told Dark Box that the United Arab Emirates is playing a dangerous behind-the-scenes role in the escalating confrontation, warning that Abu Dhabi’s moves are helping harden Addis Ababa’s position rather than pulling the two countries back from the brink.
The sources say the confrontation cannot be understood simply as another dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Behind it lies a much larger struggle over ports, military influence, regional alliances and control of the Red Sea — with the UAE emerging as one of the most consequential outside players.
Abu Dhabi is no neutral observer. It is a major political and strategic partner of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government, while the relationship between the two countries has increasingly acquired a military dimension.
According to Dark Box sources, Emirati calculations extend beyond the survival of an allied government in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia’s search for direct access to the Red Sea, the strategic value of Eritrea’s coastline, the UAE’s expanding interests around ports in the Horn of Africa and the struggle among Gulf powers for influence across the region are increasingly converging in the same crisis.
The sources warn that the result is an extraordinarily dangerous equation: Ethiopia wants the sea, Eritrea fears for its coastline, wars are already raging in Tigray and Sudan, and regional powers are lining up behind competing camps.
Diplomatic Relations Collapse as War Moves Closer
The crisis entered a dramatically more dangerous phase on October 1 when Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled 10 Eritrean diplomats, accusing Eritrea of hostile actions and of supporting an armed opposition alliance led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
Eritrea denies supporting the alliance and responded by severing all diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.
The diplomatic rupture unfolded as renewed fighting intensified in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopian federal forces and allied militias have been advancing toward Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, while opposition forces have demonstrated capabilities that could threaten targets far beyond the traditional battlefield.
Explosions were also heard in Addis Ababa. A source linked to the opposition alliance said drones had targeted the headquarters of Ethiopia’s federal forces and other sites, although Reuters said it could not independently verify that account.
The African Union has now publicly warned of the danger. It said it was following escalating tensions involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt “with concern” and called on all three governments to exercise maximum restraint and avoid actions or statements capable of further destabilizing the region.
But the diplomatic architecture intended to contain an Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation is itself collapsing.
Embassies are closing. Diplomats are being expelled. Accusations of supporting armed groups are escalating. Military operations are expanding.
The possibility of another war is no longer theoretical.
The Real Prize: The Red Sea
At the heart of the confrontation is one of the most strategically important questions facing Ethiopia: access to the sea.
Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea gained independence in 1993. Addis Ababa now publicly presents maritime access as vital to its economy and national security.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed says Ethiopia intends to obtain that access peacefully.
Eritrea is not reassured.
Asmara fears that Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions could eventually become a military attempt to take control of Assab, Eritrea’s strategically located port on the Red Sea.
That fear has become increasingly important as relations between the former allies have deteriorated.
Assab sits opposite Yemen, close to the Bab el-Mandeb, the maritime chokepoint connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.
At a time when conflict in Yemen and instability across the Middle East have dramatically increased the strategic importance of Red Sea shipping routes, access to this coastline carries significance far beyond Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Whoever gains influence over the ports and corridors surrounding the southern Red Sea acquires leverage over one of the world’s most sensitive commercial and military arteries.
And that is precisely where the UAE enters the equation.
Abu Dhabi’s Expanding Footprint
The UAE has spent years building economic, political and security influence throughout the Horn of Africa.
Reuters describes Abu Dhabi as a major backer of Ethiopia’s government and says the UAE has established itself as an influential regional power through multibillion-dollar investments, intensive diplomacy and discreet military support.
The relationship has deep roots.
Months after Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, the UAE pledged $3 billion in aid and investment to Ethiopia, including $1 billion intended to ease the country’s foreign-currency shortage.
The military relationship has also deepened.
In 2025, the Ethiopian and Emirati air forces signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at developing the air and defense capabilities of both countries.
But perhaps the most striking evidence of how closely Emirati and Ethiopian strategic interests have become intertwined emerged from neighboring Sudan.
A Secret Camp, Thousands of Fighters and the UAE Connection
A Reuters investigation published in February found that Ethiopia was hosting a secret camp for thousands of fighters intended to reinforce Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces.
Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, told Reuters that the UAE financed construction of the camp and provided military trainers and logistical support.
An internal Ethiopian security note reviewed by Reuters said approximately 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training there in early January and that their logistical and military supplies were being provided by the UAE.
Reuters could not independently verify the UAE’s involvement in the facility or its purpose, and Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied supporting the RSF in Sudan’s war.
Satellite imagery nevertheless confirmed extensive construction at the site, while Reuters also documented new infrastructure at nearby Asosa airport consistent with drone operations.
Two sources said the airport refurbishment had also been financed by the UAE, though Reuters could not independently verify the source of that funding.
Months later, Sudan’s military accused Ethiopia and the UAE of involvement in drone attacks against Khartoum and other Sudanese targets. Ethiopia rejected the accusations, while the UAE denies backing the RSF.
These claims do not establish that the same infrastructure or relationship is being used against Eritrea.
But they demonstrate something strategically significant: the UAE-Ethiopia relationship already extends into military cooperation and into the conflicts surrounding Ethiopia.
For Dark Box sources, that history makes Abu Dhabi’s position in the present Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis impossible to treat as that of an ordinary outside observer.
Eritrea Accuses UAE of “Port Imperialism”
Asmara itself has publicly sounded the alarm over Abu Dhabi’s regional ambitions.
Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh recently accused the UAE of pursuing what he called “port imperialism” across Africa.
Saleh questioned whether the UAE’s growing presence around African ports and maritime infrastructure could be understood purely as commercial investment.
Eritrean officials also told Middle East Eye that the UAE had previously sought a military facility on an island in Eritrea’s Dahlak Archipelago that would have been shared with Israel. According to those officials, Asmara rejected the proposal.
That claim has not been independently established.
But Eritrea’s distrust of Abu Dhabi is no longer hidden.
Asmara increasingly sees the UAE, Ethiopia and Israel as part of a converging strategic landscape around the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Dark Box sources likewise point to what they say is a growing convergence of Emirati, Israeli and Ethiopian interests in the region.
Somaliland, Puntland and Ethiopia’s Road to the Sea
There is another crucial piece of the puzzle.
The UAE has developed extensive interests in Somaliland and Puntland, two strategically located territories along the Gulf of Aden.
Reuters reports that Emirati relationships with Somaliland and Puntland could help provide landlocked Ethiopia with access to the Red Sea.
That connection gives Abu Dhabi an unusually important position.
Ethiopia needs maritime access.
The UAE has relationships with territories capable of providing maritime corridors.
Eritrea controls another strategically valuable route through Assab.
And Abu Dhabi has extensive interests in the ports, trade corridors and security architecture surrounding the entire region.
This does not prove that the UAE is directing Ethiopian policy toward Eritrea.
But it explains why the outcome of the confrontation matters enormously to Abu Dhabi.
Dark Box Sources: Abu Dhabi Is Hardening the Equation
Against this background, Dark Box sources say Emirati moves are contributing to a harder Ethiopian position rather than encouraging genuine de-escalation with Asmara.
The sources say Abu Dhabi sees Ethiopia as a cornerstone of its regional strategy and does not want Addis Ababa strategically contained by a coalition of states aligned against it.
They point to Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, the UAE’s port interests, military cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Addis Ababa and the changing balance of power across the Horn as parts of the same strategic picture.
The sources stop short of saying that the UAE has issued an order for Ethiopia to attack Eritrea.
Dark Box has not independently established that Abu Dhabi has approved, planned or directed an Ethiopian military operation against Eritrea.
But the sources say Emirati policy is contributing to an environment in which Ethiopian assertiveness is being reinforced rather than restrained.
That distinction is important.
The accusation is not simply that Abu Dhabi wants influence in Ethiopia. That influence is already well established.
The more serious question raised by the sources is whether the UAE is using its political, military and economic weight in ways that make confrontation more likely.
A Gulf Rivalry Moves Across the Red Sea
The Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation is also becoming entangled in another struggle: the rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Reuters reported that competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has spread from Yemen across the Red Sea into the Horn of Africa.
The emerging alignments are increasingly difficult to ignore.
The UAE is a major backer of Ethiopia.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is broadly aligned with Egypt, Eritrea and the Sudanese Armed Forces — all rivals of Ethiopia in the current regional configuration.
In Sudan, the divide is even clearer.
The UAE has repeatedly been accused of supporting the RSF, which Abu Dhabi denies, while Egypt and Eritrea have supported Sudan’s army and Riyadh maintains close relations with it.
A senior African diplomat told Reuters earlier this year that Saudi Arabia had realized it risked “losing the Red Sea.”
The Horn of Africa is therefore becoming an extension of a much wider geopolitical struggle.
Local wars, Gulf rivalries, African territorial disputes and competition for maritime corridors are increasingly overlapping.
From Tigray to Sudan: One Conflict System
This is why another Ethiopia-Eritrea war could be exceptionally difficult to contain.
The front lines are already connected.
War has returned to Tigray.
Sudan remains engulfed in conflict.
Ethiopia accuses Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of supporting its armed opponents. All three deny the accusations.
Sudan has accused Ethiopia of allowing its territory to be used for drone operations against Sudanese targets.
The UAE has been accused of supporting the RSF.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Eritrea are closer to Sudan’s army.
Somaliland and Puntland sit along potential maritime routes for Ethiopia.
And across the water, conflict in Yemen has again placed the Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping routes at the center of international security calculations.
A war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would therefore not begin on an empty chessboard.
It would erupt directly into an existing network of wars, military partnerships and competing regional alliances.
If the Horn Explodes, Abu Dhabi Will Be Part of the Equation
Ethiopia and Eritrea were allies only a few years ago.
Eritrean forces fought alongside Abiy Ahmed’s government during the devastating 2020-2022 Tigray war.
Today, the alliance has collapsed.
Addis Ababa accuses Asmara of supporting forces seeking to overthrow Abiy’s government.
Asmara accuses Ethiopia of supporting Eritrean armed opposition groups and seeking regime change.
Ethiopia says access to the sea is vital.
Eritrea fears Ethiopia could eventually attempt to seize Assab.
And behind this confrontation stand outside powers whose interests stretch far beyond the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.
For Dark Box sources, this is the central point.
If war erupts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it will not simply be another conflict between two neighboring African states.
It could become an explosion at the center of an international struggle for the Red Sea, Assab, strategic ports, military corridors and political dominance across the Horn of Africa.
The UAE’s established military relationship with Ethiopia, its strategic interests around Somaliland and Puntland, its deep involvement in regional power politics and the accusations surrounding its activities in neighboring Sudan mean Abu Dhabi cannot be treated as a distant spectator.
Dark Box sources go further: they say the UAE is actively contributing to the hardening of the confrontation.
That claim remains separate from what has been independently established. There is currently no public evidence proving that Abu Dhabi has ordered Ethiopia to attack Eritrea or approved a plan to seize Assab.
But the wider picture is becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss.
As embassies close, armies mobilize, alliances shift and the struggle for the Red Sea intensifies, Abu Dhabi is positioned not on the margins of the emerging crisis, but close to its geopolitical center.
