Abu Dhabi’s anti-Muslim influence campaign reaches Egypt’s courts: 35 European organizations placed on terrorism lists
Dark Box | Special Investigative Report | November 12, 2026
Egypt’s sweeping decision advances a long-standing Emirati political agenda
A sweeping Egyptian court decision targeting Muslim institutions across Europe has brought renewed attention to the United Arab Emirates’ campaign against organizations it associates with the Muslim Brotherhood.
On November 10, 2026, a Cairo Criminal Court ruling placed 35 organizations and 36 individuals on Egypt’s terrorism lists for five years. The designated institutions include the Council of European Muslims, the European Council for Fatwa and Research, the European Council of Imams, and Muslim associations operating in Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, and other European countries.
The decision is particularly significant because it extends Egypt’s counterterrorism framework beyond its borders to religious, educational, cultural, and community institutions serving European Muslims.
The ruling also closely resembles a central objective of Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy: persuading other governments to adopt its expansive approach to organizations associated with political Islam.
This convergence is not merely ideological. Investigations into Emirati influence operations have previously documented efforts to identify, discredit, and politically isolate Muslim individuals and organizations in Europe. Meanwhile, the UAE has openly encouraged European policymakers to adopt its approach to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Egypt’s decision now adds a powerful judicial dimension to a wider international campaign that could affect the civic participation, religious institutions, and financial security of Muslim communities across Europe.
From Cairo to Europe: 35 organizations and 36 individuals targeted
The Egyptian ruling was issued in connection with Case No. 11108 of 2026 and published in the Egyptian Official Gazette.
Its scope extends across numerous European countries, encompassing national Muslim associations alongside institutions dedicated to religious scholarship, family affairs, women’s activities, education, and community development.
Among those designated are the Council of European Muslims and its branches, Muslims of France, the Muslim Association of Britain, the Swiss Muslim League, the German Islamic Community, and organizations in Sweden, Italy, Spain, Ireland, and several other countries.
The ruling also names the European Council for the Holy Quran, the European Council for Muslim Women, the European Forum of Muslim Students, and the European Institute of Human Sciences.
Under Egyptian law, terrorism-list designations can trigger asset freezes, restrictions on activities and financing, and other legal measures. Listed individuals may face travel restrictions and additional financial controls.
The decision does not automatically impose equivalent sanctions throughout Europe. European governments and institutions retain their own legal procedures for determining whether organizations should be restricted or designated.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian ruling creates a new political and legal pressure point for organizations operating across national borders.
The Council of European Muslims rejected the decision on November 12 and announced plans to challenge it through legal channels, raising objections concerning jurisdiction and the application of Egyptian counterterrorism measures to institutions operating in Europe.
The dispute therefore reaches beyond the organizations named in the ruling. It concerns the extent to which a Middle Eastern government’s security classifications can influence the treatment of Muslim civil society organizations in European democracies.
Abu Dhabi’s European campaign: an influence operation documented in leaked files
The Egyptian decision arrives against the backdrop of extensive reporting on Emirati efforts to shape perceptions of Muslim organizations in Europe.
In 2023, the European Investigative Collaborations network, working with Mediapart and other media organizations, published the Abu Dhabi Secrets investigation.
Drawing on confidential records associated with the Swiss private intelligence company Alp Services, the investigation documented the compilation of extensive lists of individuals and organizations presented as connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.
The records identified more than 1,000 individuals and over 400 organizations across 18 European countries.
The operation went far beyond monitoring political activists.
Those identified in the material included politicians, academics, journalists, anti-racism campaigners, and civic organizations whose actual activities did not necessarily support the classifications assigned to them.
Among the names appearing in the documents were former French presidential candidate Benoît Hamon, anti-racism activist Rokhaya Diallo, and institutions such as France’s National Centre for Scientific Research.
The investigation also detailed methods used to influence public perceptions and institutional decisions, including media interventions, alterations to online information, and efforts affecting banking relationships.
The reporting connected these activities to the UAE through the firm’s work for Emirati intelligence interests. Alp Services disputed aspects of the leaked material.
These revelations established an important precedent: Abu Dhabi’s campaign against perceived Brotherhood influence had extended into European political and civic life, with consequences reaching people and institutions far beyond organizations directly associated with the movement.
The Egyptian ruling now places a wide range of European Muslim institutions under a terrorism designation issued by a government closely aligned with Abu Dhabi.
The UAE openly promotes its counterterrorism model in Europe
Abu Dhabi has not concealed its ambition to influence European policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood.
On June 2, 2026, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly reported the participation of Mohammed Ismail Al Sahlawi, the Emirati ambassador to the European Union, Belgium, and Luxembourg, in a European Parliament conference concerning the Muslim Brotherhood.
According to the ministry’s own account, participants praised the UAE’s designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and encouraged European policymakers to draw on the Emirati model.
The conference also produced recommendations calling for an EU-wide designation, restrictions on funding for organizations associated with radical Islam, and coordinated measures against activists.
The ambassador reaffirmed the UAE’s approach and its support for international cooperation against organizations the government considers extremist.
This official participation is direct evidence that Abu Dhabi is actively promoting its preferred counterterrorism policies within European political institutions.
It also demonstrates how the Emirates seeks to transform its domestic security classifications into a model for other governments.
The implications for European Muslim communities are substantial.
Where distinctions between violent activity, nonviolent political activism, religious association, and ordinary community participation become blurred, expansive security measures can affect organizations whose work falls within the legitimate exercise of freedom of religion, expression, and association.
The Egypt–UAE partnership and the export of security policy
Egypt and the UAE have maintained a close political and strategic partnership since the removal of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013.
Both governments have pursued restrictive policies toward the Muslim Brotherhood, although their domestic legal frameworks and political circumstances differ.
For Abu Dhabi, opposition to the Brotherhood has become a defining feature of its regional relationships and international diplomatic messaging.
For Cairo, the Brotherhood remains a central target of its national security policies.
The November 10 ruling therefore reflects a striking alignment between the Egyptian government’s domestic priorities and the UAE’s wider international campaign.
Its significance lies in the scale of the organizations affected and their geographical reach.
Rather than concentrating exclusively on organizations operating within Egypt, the decision encompasses institutions embedded in European Muslim civic life.
This expansion creates an opportunity for the UAE’s preferred political narrative to gain additional support from a formal judicial decision issued by a regional ally.
Yet political alignment and documented Emirati lobbying do not establish who initiated the Egyptian proceedings or directed the court’s ruling. Establishing that connection would require communications, financial records, official testimony, or other evidence identifying Emirati involvement in the specific case.
The distinction matters because the broader Emirati campaign is already visible through official statements and investigative records, without requiring unsupported conclusions about the internal decision-making of an Egyptian court.
When counterterrorism measures reach religious and community institutions
The organizations included in the Egyptian ruling operate in several distinct fields.
Some engage in religious scholarship. Others provide educational programs, represent community interests, organize cultural activities, or address questions facing Muslim families in Europe.
Their inclusion on a single terrorism list raises important questions about the evidentiary standards used to distinguish prohibited conduct from lawful religious and civic activity.
European governments have their own debates about political Islam, foreign influence, and the activities of organizations associated with the Brotherhood. Some European officials have expressed concerns about ideological networks, institutional influence, and the transparency of funding.
Those concerns deserve examination through independent evidence and established legal procedures.
But the existence of political or religious associations cannot itself establish involvement in terrorism.
The danger of expansive classifications is that ordinary Muslim participation in public life can become entangled with security narratives developed through international political competition.
The Abu Dhabi Secrets investigation demonstrated how broadly such classifications can spread when intelligence assessments and influence operations are insufficiently scrutinized.
Egypt’s new list gives that concern immediate relevance.
The danger of importing Abu Dhabi’s security agenda into Europe
The UAE presents its approach as a defense against extremism and a contribution to international security.
Its critics point to the potential for that approach to stigmatize Muslim organizations, undermine independent civil society, and encourage the treatment of lawful political or religious activity as a security threat.
The Egyptian ruling intensifies this debate by naming institutions across Europe that operate under different national laws and constitutional protections.
For the designated organizations, the immediate consequences may include reputational harm, uncertainty over international financial relationships, and increased scrutiny of their activities.
For European governments, the challenge is to distinguish credible evidence of unlawful conduct from classifications originating in the political conflicts of foreign states.
For Muslim communities, the broader concern is that international campaigns against the Brotherhood could expand into restrictions affecting people and institutions with no demonstrated involvement in violence.
The UAE’s documented influence activities make it a particularly important actor in this debate.
Its diplomatic promotion of terrorism designations, together with the earlier Alp Services revelations, shows how counterterrorism messaging can become an instrument of international political influence.
Conclusion: Egypt’s ruling gives new force to Abu Dhabi’s European agenda
The November 10 decision represents a significant expansion of Egypt’s terrorism-listing framework into European Muslim civic and religious life.
It also advances a policy objective that the UAE has promoted internationally: wider adoption of restrictive measures against organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
The record establishes three consequential developments.
First, Egypt has formally designated 35 organizations and 36 individuals, including numerous European Muslim institutions.
Second, Abu Dhabi has publicly promoted its counterterrorism model among European policymakers.
Third, international investigations have documented extensive Emirati-linked operations targeting individuals and organizations in Europe through accusations of Brotherhood affiliation.
Together, these developments reveal a wider struggle over the political and institutional future of Muslim communities in Europe.
Abu Dhabi’s international campaign deserves scrutiny not only for the organizations it seeks to isolate, but also for the consequences its methods can have for freedom of religion, association, and political participation.
Egypt’s ruling adds a new instrument to that wider struggle. Whether the decision was directly influenced by Emirati officials remains a separate evidentiary question, but its political compatibility with Abu Dhabi’s established agenda is unmistakable.
The critical test for European governments is whether foreign security narratives will be accepted without independent examination or subjected to the evidentiary standards and fundamental-rights protections required by European law.
Dark Box | Special Investigative Report | November 12, 2026



