Dubai’s Dirty Gold Empire Exposed: UAE Imported 591 Tons of Illicit Gold as Sudan’s War Fuels a Multibillion-Dollar Trade

Dark Box | Special Investigative Report | November 14, 2026
The gold trail leads to Abu Dhabi
The United Arab Emirates has consolidated its position at the center of the global trade in smuggled and conflict-linked gold, turning Dubai into a critical destination for precious metal extracted from African countries devastated by war, armed violence, and illicit trafficking.
A new investigation by Swiss development organization SWISSAID exposes the extraordinary scale of this trade: at least 591 metric tons of illicit gold entered the UAE in 2024, despite Emirati regulations introduced in 2023 to prevent smuggled and conflict-linked gold from entering the country’s supply chains.
The findings, published in November 2026 and reported by Middle East Eye, reveal a gold trading system in which the Emirates continues to absorb enormous quantities of African gold that bypass official export controls or originate in countries affected by armed conflict.
Sudan stands at the center of this system.
As Sudanese civilians endure one of the world’s most devastating humanitarian catastrophes, gold extracted from the country continues to flow through regional smuggling corridors toward Dubai, enriching traders, armed networks, and intermediaries operating across national borders.
The UAE is not merely a distant market for this gold. Its financial infrastructure, trading networks, refining capacity, and international commercial connections have made Dubai a central destination for precious metal leaving Sudan and other conflict-affected countries.
The findings expose a fundamental contradiction in Abu Dhabi’s regional policy: while Emirati officials publicly emphasize humanitarian assistance and financial transparency, the country’s gold market continues to receive vast quantities of metal associated with smuggling, conflict economies, and armed groups.
The central scandal is not simply that Sudanese gold is disappearing across international borders. It is that Dubai remains the destination where much of this gold enters the formal international market.
591 tons of illicit gold: the scale of the UAE’s trade
SWISSAID’s investigation, based on trade data covering 2021 through 2025 and interviews with more than 150 stakeholders, establishes the scale of the illicit gold flows reaching the Emirates.
Its findings for 2024 are particularly striking:
- At least 591 metric tons of gold classified by the researchers as illicit entered the UAE.
- Approximately 413 tons consisted of gold smuggled out of African countries before being officially imported into the Emirates.
- At least 174.5 tons originated directly or indirectly from Sudan, Yemen, and Russia, which SWISSAID classified as conflict-gold sources.
- Around 70 percent of gold extracted in Africa was shipped to the UAE in 2024, according to the report’s estimates.
- More than 95 percent of gold recorded by importing partners as originating from Sudan, Niger, the Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Libya, Togo, and Cameroon went to the UAE.
These figures establish the Emirates’ extraordinary concentration of trade in gold originating from countries affected by weak export controls, armed conflict, and illicit trafficking.
They also demonstrate the failure of the Emirati regulatory measures introduced in 2023 to produce the promised transformation in the gold market.
SWISSAID found that the rules had not stopped smuggled African gold from entering the country. Its data instead indicated a slight increase in these flows.
Marc Ummel, head of SWISSAID’s commodities unit and co-author of the investigation, described the findings as deeply concerning and identified the Emirates as an enduring hub for smuggled and conflict gold.
For Dark Box, the implications extend beyond commercial compliance.
The UAE’s gold market has become a critical international outlet for wealth extracted from countries where armed violence, political instability, and resource exploitation are closely intertwined.
The 591-ton figure is SWISSAID’s estimate of illicit gold imports, not a finding that every individual shipment was criminally adjudicated. It nevertheless represents a major indictment of the effectiveness of the UAE’s gold-trading safeguards.
Sudan’s gold: the financial artery of a devastating war
Gold has become one of the most important financial resources in Sudan’s war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023.
Both sides operate within a conflict economy in which access to gold-producing regions, mining revenues, transportation corridors, and commercial intermediaries has major strategic significance.
The RSF’s financial connections to Sudan’s gold sector are particularly well documented.
The paramilitary force, commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, has long maintained economic interests in gold-producing areas of Darfur.
Companies associated with the Dagalo family helped convert access to gold resources into financial and commercial power.
Among the most prominent is Al-Junaid, a gold trading company associated with the RSF leadership.
The US Treasury Department sanctioned Al-Junaid in June 2023, identifying it as an entity connected to the RSF and its leadership and describing its role in the group’s commercial operations.
Gold exports and trading relationships helped provide the RSF’s leadership with access to resources outside Sudan’s formal state financial institutions.
Dubai emerged as an important commercial destination within this system.
The consequences are severe.
Gold is not simply another export commodity during Sudan’s war. It is a source of revenue that can be converted into purchasing power, logistics, and military capacity.
When gold originating from armed-group-controlled territory reaches international markets, the proceeds can help sustain the economic structures on which those groups depend.
Sudan’s mineral wealth, which should support the country’s population and reconstruction, has instead become entangled in financial networks operating alongside a catastrophic war.
Dubai: the bridge between African conflict gold and global financial markets
The new SWISSAID report identifies a wider system in which gold extracted or smuggled from African countries is transported to the UAE, where it enters one of the world’s largest precious-metals markets.
The scale is staggering.
Between 2012 and 2022, more than 2,500 tons of smuggled African gold, valued at over $115 billion, reached the Emirates, according to SWISSAID’s earlier research.
The new investigation demonstrates that the pattern has continued despite the introduction of additional Emirati regulations.
For 2024, SWISSAID calculated that 453 tons of smuggled African gold reached the UAE, including 413 tons arriving directly and another 40 tons routed through neighboring countries. That distinction matters: the smaller figure represents direct flows, not the full African smuggling total. <Cite ref=”turn466489search25″/>
Dubai’s position as a major gold-trading center gives the Emirates an important role in connecting African producers and traders with buyers in Asia and Europe.
The commercial system includes traders, brokers, refiners, transportation companies, and international financial institutions.
Gold passing through multiple intermediaries can become increasingly difficult to trace to its original mine, especially when it is melted, refined, or mixed with other supplies.
This is the central vulnerability exposed by SWISSAID.
The Emirates provides an international commercial gateway through which gold originating in conflict zones can move into global supply chains despite serious weaknesses in origin verification.
Sudan’s smuggling corridors converge on Dubai
The routes connecting Sudan’s mines to Dubai demonstrate how deeply the UAE is embedded in the regional gold economy.
According to Sudanese traders interviewed by Middle East Eye, gold extracted in RSF-controlled territory moves through neighboring countries including Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Kenya.
Gold originating in territory controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces frequently moves through Egypt.
Although the routes differ, Dubai remains a major final destination.
The trade depends heavily on private merchants and intermediaries who purchase gold from artisanal miners, consolidate shipments, and arrange their movement across borders.
Sudanese gold expert Suliman Baldo estimated that artisanal mining accounts for approximately 85 to 90 percent of Sudan’s gold production.
That fragmented production structure creates substantial opportunities for smuggling.
Individual miners frequently operate outside formal financial and regulatory systems, while larger traders possess the capital and commercial connections needed to move gold internationally.
The result is a network in which Sudanese gold can leave the country through several neighboring states before reaching the UAE.
SWISSAID’s detailed figures show that 59 tons of Sudanese gold reached the Emirates directly or indirectly in 2024. Of that amount, 29 tons were imported directly and 30 tons through neighboring countries. The researchers counted 36.8 tons within their African smuggling estimate to avoid double-counting. <Cite ref=”turn466489search25″/>
The implications for Sudan are profound.
Every shipment that bypasses official export channels can deprive the country of revenue and weaken the institutions needed to regulate its mineral wealth.
Where armed organizations control mining operations or trading networks, gold revenues can also strengthen the economic foundations of war.
The UAE’s record extends beyond Sudan
Sudan is not the only conflict economy connected to the Emirates’ gold market.
SWISSAID identified at least 174.5 tons of gold entering the UAE in 2024 from Sudan, Yemen, and Russia, directly or through intermediary countries.
The organization classified these imports as conflict gold for the purposes of its investigation.
The breakdown included 108.9 tons associated with Russia, 6.6 tons from Yemen, and 59 tons from Sudan.
These figures demonstrate the geographic reach of the Emirates’ gold trade.
The UAE is receiving precious metal from multiple countries affected by warfare, sanctions, or serious supply-chain risks.
The connection between gold trading and armed organizations has also attracted direct US government enforcement.
In June 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned companies operating in the UAE and the Central African Republic for involvement in illicit gold dealings supporting Russia’s Wagner Group. <Cite ref=”turn466489search3″/>
That same month, the Treasury sanctioned Al-Junaid, identifying gold mining and exports as a vital revenue source for the Dagalo family and the RSF. It also designated UAE-based Tradive General Trading, describing its role in procuring vehicles for the RSF. <Cite ref=”turn466489search0″/>
These sanctions establish that UAE-based commercial networks have been used in transactions benefiting armed organizations.
They also show why the debate over Dubai’s gold market cannot be reduced to routine trade compliance.
It is a matter of international financial security, sanctions enforcement, and the financing of armed conflict.
The regulatory failure: only two fully compliant reviews
One of SWISSAID’s most damaging findings concerns the implementation of Emirati gold regulations.
In January 2023, the UAE introduced new due diligence requirements intended to improve the responsible sourcing of gold.
Yet SWISSAID’s examination of 52 refinery review reports covering 2023 through 2025 found that only two received an overall rating of fully compliant.
The majority of refineries assessed failed to comply completely or implemented the requirements only partially. <Cite ref=”turn466489search1″/>
This finding strikes at the credibility of Abu Dhabi’s claims of progress in regulating its precious-metals sector.
The problem is not merely the absence of rules. It is the failure to ensure that existing requirements are consistently implemented.
SWISSAID has consequently called for stronger penalties, public disclosure of noncompliance, improved customs inspections, and greater transparency regarding suppliers operating in high-risk areas.
The organization has also recommended that the Financial Action Task Force place the UAE back on its gray list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
A gold-trading system that receives hundreds of tons of illicit metal while most assessed refineries fall short of full compliance cannot credibly present its safeguards as sufficient.
Switzerland and the international responsibility for Dubai’s gold trade
The responsibility for addressing these flows does not end at the UAE’s borders.
Switzerland, the world’s largest gold-trading hub, is a major destination for gold exported from the Emirates.
According to SWISSAID, Switzerland imported 420 tons of gold from the UAE in 2025, representing approximately 36 percent of Emirati gold exports.
Between January and September 2026, Swiss imports from the UAE had already exceeded 400 tons.
The organization identified Swiss refinery Valcambi as the principal importer of this gold.
SWISSAID reported that Valcambi responded to its questions but did not clarify the ultimate origin of the gold it purchased from the UAE. <Cite ref=”turn466489search2″/>
These commercial relationships demonstrate that the problem extends into international refining and financial markets.
Gold that enters Dubai through opaque supply chains can subsequently be exported to major trading centers, where its original provenance may remain difficult to establish.
The UAE therefore occupies a pivotal position in a much larger system.
Dubai is the gateway, but international buyers and refiners also have responsibilities to establish the origin of the metal they purchase.
Without meaningful verification throughout the supply chain, stronger regulations in one jurisdiction may have limited practical effect.
Conclusion: Dubai’s gold wealth carries a devastating human cost
SWISSAID’s November 2026 investigation exposes a systemic failure in the UAE’s gold trade.
At least 591 tons of illicit gold, valued at approximately $74 billion using November 2026 prices, entered the Emirates in 2024.
The findings document an international trading hub that continues to receive smuggled African gold and metal originating from countries devastated by armed conflict.
Sudan provides one of the starkest examples.
Its mineral wealth is being extracted and transported through regional networks while armed groups, commercial intermediaries, and foreign markets compete for the proceeds.
US sanctions have established the role of gold in financing the RSF’s commercial network, while SWISSAID’s findings demonstrate the continuing importance of Dubai as a destination for Sudanese gold.
The UAE’s regulatory reforms have failed to prevent the enormous flows documented in the investigation.
The Emirates cannot separate the prosperity of its gold market from the origins of the metal entering it.
When gold extracted from war-torn countries reaches international markets through opaque networks, the commercial profits must be examined alongside the violence, exploitation, and financial losses associated with those supply chains.
Dubai’s gold trade has become a global accountability issue.
The evidence demands enforceable origin verification, transparent trading records, meaningful penalties for regulatory violations, and international scrutiny of the networks connecting conflict economies to major financial centers.
Sudan’s gold should finance Sudan’s future, not disappear into international trading networks while its people endure war and displacement.
The SWISSAID investigation makes one conclusion unavoidable: the UAE remains a central destination for illicit and conflict-linked gold, and its existing safeguards have failed to stop the trade.
Dark Box | Special Investigative Report | November 14, 2026



