THE DRONES, THE BLACKOUTS, AND THE UAE–ETHIOPIA CONNECTION
How Sudan’s Power Grid Became a Target—and Why New Reports Are Bringing Abu Dhabi’s Reported Military Support for the RSF Back Under Investigation
DARK BOX | SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
October 30, 2026
Ten Power Facilities in Four Days: Sudan’s Civilian Infrastructure Under Attack
Between October 26 and 29, 2026, a succession of drone strikes hit at least ten electricity facilities across six Sudanese states controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces.
The targets were spread across Khartoum, White Nile, Gedaref, Gezira, Sennar, and South Kordofan.
Electricity substations, transmission facilities, and generating infrastructure were damaged, triggering widespread blackouts.
On October 30, another drone attack struck the Shendi substation in River Nile State, extending the campaign farther north.
Sudan Electricity Holding Company attributed the attacks to the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group fighting the Sudanese army.
Independent humanitarian monitoring also identified the RSF as responsible for the wave of attacks.
The geographical scale is striking. Rather than concentrating on a single frontline, the strikes reached electricity facilities serving multiple regions.
For Sudanese civilians, the consequences were immediate: electricity outages, disrupted services, and additional pressure on a country whose infrastructure has already been devastated by war.
For investigators, the attacks raise a second question.
How is the RSF sustaining a drone campaign across such a wide geographical area, and what external military infrastructure may be enabling it?
The Targets: A Campaign Against the National Electricity Network
The United Network for Humanity Observatory identified ten electricity installations struck between October 26 and 29.
They included Al-Markhiyat in Khartoum, Tendelti and Mashkour in White Nile, Al-Faw and Al-Hawata in Gedaref, Al-Junayd and Al-Managil in Gezira, Singa in Sennar, Kadugli in South Kordofan, and Umm Dabaker in White Nile.
The attacks damaged critical equipment and forced facilities out of service.
On October 26, Sudan Electricity Holding Company reported strikes against five substations in the southeastern electricity network.
On October 27, a drone hit Al-Markhiyat northwest of Omdurman, cutting electricity across parts of the capital.
The following day, Al-Managil and other locations came under attack.
On October 29, the Umm Dabaker thermal power station in Rabak was struck, disrupting electricity supplies in White Nile and North Kordofan.
By October 30, the campaign had reached Shendi, where an attack caused another major blackout.
This sequence demonstrates the vulnerability of Sudan’s interconnected electricity system.
A damaged substation can interrupt services across communities far removed from the actual strike.
Attacks on power infrastructure also complicate restoration efforts, particularly when technical teams must operate amid continuing insecurity.
From Sudan to Ethiopia: The Cross-Border Reports
On October 28, Sudanese officials publicly accused Ethiopia of involvement in the drone attacks.
At a press conference in Khartoum, representatives of the Sudanese government and intelligence services presented drone fragments, technical flight information, and satellite imagery.
They said the material identified launch locations inside Ethiopian territory, including Bahir Dar Airport.
Sudanese officials also accused the United Arab Emirates of supporting the military operations.
The reports represent an escalation in the dispute because they identify possible launch facilities beyond Sudan’s borders.
If independently verified, the flight information could establish that some attacks were conducted using Ethiopian territory.
But the material presented by Sudanese authorities has not yet been independently authenticated in the reporting reviewed for this investigation.
The public evidence therefore supports a serious report requiring investigation, not a definitive finding that every strike originated in Ethiopia.
The distinction is important because the identity of a launch site, the identity of drone operators, and the identity of those financing the operation are separate questions.
The February Revelation: An RSF Training Camp Inside Ethiopia
The October reports acquire greater significance when examined alongside an earlier Reuters investigation.
On February 10, 2026, Reuters reported that Ethiopia was hosting a secret camp for training thousands of RSF fighters.
The investigation relied on satellite imagery, documents, and interviews with officials and other knowledgeable sources.
Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the UAE financed the camp and provided military trainers and logistical support.
Reuters also examined an Ethiopian security-service document and a diplomatic cable containing similar reports.
The reported facility was located in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, near Sudan.
According to the investigation, approximately 4,300 recruits were at the camp by early January, and its planned capacity could reach 10,000.
The camp reportedly trained recruits from Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan.
Reuters also reported allegations of Emirati financing for upgrades at Asosa Airport, where Ethiopian officials and analysts described plans for expanded drone capabilities.
These findings provided independently reported evidence of an RSF recruitment and training operation in Ethiopia.
Reuters could not independently verify the UAE’s financing role, and Abu Dhabi denied involvement.
Nevertheless, the investigation exposed a potentially significant cross-border support structure.
Asosa Airport and the Drone Infrastructure Question
The Asosa findings deserve particular attention.
Reuters reported that Ethiopian military officials were considering the airport as a drone operations center.
The investigation also described a wider plan to develop drone facilities in western Ethiopia.
According to sources cited by Reuters, improvements at Asosa were linked to the RSF’s expanding presence in the region.
Two sources said that the UAE helped finance the airport improvements.
The existence of an airport capable of supporting drone operations does not establish that it was used in the October strikes.
Nor does it prove that Emirati personnel controlled any aircraft operating from the facility.
But the reporting provides a concrete basis for investigating whether RSF-linked recruitment, logistics, and aerial operations have become connected across the Ethiopian border.
It also raises questions about the potential use of Ethiopian facilities to supply or support operations inside Sudan.
These questions cannot be answered through political accusations alone.
They require independently verified records of aircraft movements, equipment transfers, personnel deployments, and command relationships.
Dark Box’s Earlier Investigation Returns to the Center of the Story
Dark Box previously examined reports that the UAE was supporting fighter recruitment and the use of military facilities in Ethiopia to assist the RSF.
The latest attacks make that earlier investigative focus more consequential.
There are now three distinct bodies of reporting that deserve examination together.
First, the February Reuters investigation documented an RSF training operation inside Ethiopia and reported Emirati financing, trainers, and logistical support.
Second, Sudanese authorities presented material in October that they say links drone attacks on Sudanese infrastructure to launch locations inside Ethiopia.
Third, independent reporting documented a geographically dispersed campaign against Sudan’s electricity network.
Together, these developments support the central concern raised in Dark Box’s earlier investigation: that the RSF may benefit from an external support network extending into Ethiopia.
They also provide grounds for renewed investigation into Abu Dhabi’s role.
However, the latest attacks do not independently confirm that the UAE directed the drone missions or that the facilities identified by Reuters were used to launch them.
The strongest conclusion supported by the available evidence is that Dark Box’s earlier line of inquiry has become more urgent and more relevant—not that every report within it has been conclusively proved.
The UAE’s Reported Role: Financing, Training, and Logistics
The reports against Abu Dhabi extend beyond general diplomatic alignment.
The Reuters investigation identified claims of specific forms of assistance: financing construction, supplying trainers, and providing logistical support.
These are operationally significant reports.
Training facilities can expand the supply of fighters.
Logistical networks can move personnel and equipment.
Airport improvements can increase the capacity to transport supplies or operate aircraft.
If the Emirati support were independently established, it would indicate a deeper role in sustaining the RSF’s military capabilities than political endorsement alone.
That possibility is why the October strikes merit renewed scrutiny of the UAE’s relationship with Ethiopian facilities and RSF units.
The UAE has denied supporting the RSF and rejected reports concerning the Ethiopian training camp.
The denial must be considered alongside the reported evidence, rather than treated as proof that the allegations are false or true.
The unanswered issue is whether investigators can establish direct links between Emirati-linked financing or personnel and the units responsible for the electricity-grid attacks.
Why Ethiopia Matters Strategically
Ethiopia shares a long border with Sudan.
Its western regions offer possible logistical access to Sudanese territory, while existing transport and aviation infrastructure could support the movement of personnel and equipment.
The Reuters investigation described a training operation near the border and reported concerns that RSF recruits had already crossed into Sudan.
It also documented interest in developing drone infrastructure at Asosa Airport.
Sudan’s October reports added another location—Bahir Dar Airport—to the discussion.
But the two locations play different roles in the available reporting.
Asosa is associated with the earlier investigation into training, logistics, and possible drone infrastructure.
Bahir Dar is associated with Sudanese officials’ reports about the origin of particular drone flights.
There is no independently verified public evidence establishing that these facilities operated as one coordinated system during the October attacks.
Determining whether such a system exists is now a central investigative question.
The Humanitarian Cost of the Blackouts
The consequences of attacks on electricity infrastructure reach far beyond the damaged installations.
Hospitals depend on electricity for equipment, refrigeration, lighting, and emergency treatment.
Water-treatment and pumping systems require power.
Bakeries, food storage facilities, communications systems, and sanitation services also depend on functioning electrical networks.
The October strikes disrupted services in areas where civilian communities were already coping with displacement and economic hardship.
In Khartoum, reports described hospitals and bakeries relying on generators after a major substation was struck.
The United Nations and humanitarian organizations warned that attacks affecting electricity infrastructure could deepen civilian suffering.
These consequences make the identity of those responsible—and of any external actors who knowingly assisted unlawful attacks—a matter of urgent public interest.
The Legal Question: Civilian Infrastructure and Responsibility
International humanitarian law protects civilian objects from attack.
An electricity facility does not automatically lose that protection because it is part of a national infrastructure network.
Whether a particular installation constitutes a military objective depends on its actual use and the military advantage expected from attacking it.
Even when a facility is a legitimate military objective, attacks remain subject to rules governing proportionality and precautions to protect civilians.
Repeated strikes on facilities serving large civilian populations warrant close examination under these standards.
If investigations establish that the RSF deliberately attacked protected civilian infrastructure, those responsible could face serious legal consequences.
If a foreign government or other external actor knowingly provided assistance connected to unlawful operations, its potential responsibility would require a separate legal assessment.
At present, the evidence reviewed does not establish the operational chain linking the October strikes to UAE decision-makers.
That gap should be investigated rather than filled with unsupported conclusions.
What the Evidence Still Needs to Show
A conclusive investigation of the UAE–Ethiopia–RSF drone network would require several forms of corroboration.
The first is independent authentication of the flight-path data and satellite imagery presented by Sudanese officials.
The second is reliable identification of the drones used in the October strikes, including their operators and launch locations.
The third is documentation linking those operations to particular Ethiopian military facilities.
The fourth is evidence of financing, procurement, training, or command arrangements connecting any external actor to the responsible units.
The fifth is a clear account of how the relevant equipment and personnel moved between facilities and operational areas.
Without those links, evidence of a training camp and evidence of a drone strike remain important but separate findings.
The challenge for investigators is to determine whether they are parts of the same military support system.
Abu Dhabi’s Unanswered Questions
The latest developments place several specific questions before the UAE.
Did Emirati-linked entities finance the RSF training camp identified in Ethiopia?
Did they support the expansion of aviation or drone infrastructure in western Ethiopia?
Were Emirati personnel or contractors involved in training, maintaining, or supplying equipment used by RSF units?
Were any facilities associated with the earlier training operation subsequently used to support attacks on Sudanese territory?
And what evidence can the UAE provide to substantiate its denials of involvement?
These are questions of documented public interest, particularly given the scale of civilian harm caused by Sudan’s war.
The October blackouts make it necessary to examine not only who operated the drones but also the networks that may have enabled those operations.
Conclusion: Sudan’s Power Grid Attacks Demand an Investigation Beyond Its Borders
The latest drone campaign has damaged Sudan’s electricity infrastructure across multiple states and intensified civilian hardship.
At least ten major facilities were reported struck between October 26 and 29, with another attack on Shendi on October 30.
Sudanese authorities and humanitarian monitors have attributed the attacks to the RSF.
Sudanese officials have also accused Ethiopia of providing launch locations and the UAE of supporting the operations.
Those allegations follow a Reuters investigation that documented an RSF training camp inside Ethiopia and reported claims of Emirati financing and logistical assistance.
The overlap between these developments gives new relevance to Dark Box’s earlier investigation into alleged UAE-backed recruitment and military infrastructure in Ethiopia.
The issue is no longer limited to whether the RSF possesses drones. It is whether a cross-border system of recruitment, financing, logistics, and aviation facilities has helped sustain its capacity to attack Sudan.
The public record justifies a thorough investigation of that possibility.
It does not yet establish direct UAE command of the October strikes.
For Sudanese civilians living through repeated blackouts, the immediate consequences are already clear. Electricity infrastructure has been damaged, essential services disrupted, and communities exposed to further hardship.
For those investigating the war, the next task is equally clear: establish the full chain of responsibility, including any foreign assistance, using evidence that can withstand independent scrutiny.
DARK BOX | INVESTIGATIVE REPORT | OCTOBER 30, 2026
