Dark Box Sources Reveal Emirati Plan to Recreate the RSF Model in Yemen’s Hadramout Province
Well-informed sources confirmed to Dark Box that the United Arab Emirates is pursuing a covert plan to replicate the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces model in Yemen’s eastern Hadramout province, using local armed proxies to construct a parallel military structure outside the authority of the internationally recognised state. The revelation comes as tensions in the province escalate toward a possible confrontation between Emirati-backed forces and Saudi-supported tribal alliances, raising fears of a regional conflict engineered from Abu Dhabi for long-term strategic gain.
According to Dark Box sources, the plan is spearheaded by Abu Ali al-Hadrami, a senior commander within the UAE-backed Hadrami Elite Forces and one of the most influential figures in Abu Dhabi’s southern network. Al-Hadrami has reportedly been working directly with Emirati intelligence officers stationed between Mukalla and al-Rayyan, including Colonel Nasser Al-Qasimi and adviser Hudaifa Al-Mazmi, whose portfolios include tribal penetration and recruitment. The objective, the sources say, is to replicate a force similar to Sudan’s RSF: loyal not to the central government, but to Emirati leadership, financially dependent on Abu Dhabi, structured outside Yemen’s military hierarchy, and empowered with independent control over land, resources and checkpoints.
The past forty eight hours in Hadramout have exposed how advanced the Emirati project has become. The Southern Transitional Council, Abu Dhabi’s principal partner in southern Yemen, escalated sharply through a statement issued by al-Hadrami accusing the Saudi-backed Hadramout Tribes Alliance of serving “foreign agendas” and plotting to sabotage the STC’s secessionist ambitions. He warned that the STC “will not stand idly by while attempts are made to impose a new reality in Hadramout by force,” echoing the language used by RSF leaders in Sudan prior to their rapid militarisation.
The Hadramout Tribes Alliance, led by Sheikh Amr bin Habrish and supported by Saudi Arabia, responded decisively. It announced the formation of a new tribal resistance force and declared that any non-local military presence in the province would be considered an occupation. The Alliance made clear that it views the Hadrami Elite Forces not as a homegrown security body, but as an external militia imported from other southern provinces and engineered to alter the demographic and political balance of the region.
As the confrontation intensified, the Hadrami Elite Forces entered a state of high alert. Armoured vehicles were deployed around Mukalla, while operational units were instructed to prepare for a potential storming of the oil plateau that the Tribes Alliance currently holds. This plateau is one of Yemen’s most strategic energy hubs. Dark Box sources confirm that Emirati planners view its capture as essential for creating an RSF-like financial structure capable of sustaining a loyal paramilitary force over the long term.
Tribal leaders across Hadramout mobilised rapidly, sending reinforcements to defensive positions around the plateau and toward the eastern desert border. They declared publicly that they “will not allow Hadramout to slip into the chaos seen in other provinces.” Privately, several tribal figures warn that the UAE’s objective is not merely territorial control, but the establishment of a self-financing armed body that could dominate Hadramout well beyond the current conflict.
The Tribes Alliance accused “foreign-backed” forces of advancing and appealed for immediate Saudi intervention. Hundreds of tribal fighters secured control of the heights overlooking Mukalla, while a number of prominent sheikhs threatened to expand the confrontation into STC-controlled coastal zones if the Hadrami Elite Forces attempted to advance.
Dark Box sources within the Alliance disclosed that they intercepted intelligence pointing to an Emirati plan to seize the oil plateau. The strategy allegedly involves cutting Saudi supply lines, launching coordinated internal operations to control key facilities in Wadi Hadramout and securing desert routes to the Saudi border. Al-Hadrami has reportedly been holding private meetings with desert sheikhs, offering financial incentives in exchange for logistical support. These tactics mirror the Emirati approach in Sudan, where financial patronage and tribal fragmentation helped construct the RSF as a rival power to the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Last week, heavy reinforcements arrived from Aden, Abyan and Shabwa under Emirati supervision. This movement exposed deep political fractures within the Aden-based government, which reacted by dismissing the UAE-aligned governor of Hadramout, Mabkhout bin Madi, and appointing Salem al-Khanbashi as his replacement. Yet officials concede privately that the government has little real influence in eastern Yemen, and the decision is unlikely to alter the power struggle between Emirati and Saudi camps.
The growing crisis has revived warnings from local actors, including the Mahrah Sit-in Committee, which accused the UAE of “lighting the fuse of a wider conflict” aimed at seizing Hadramout’s resources and transforming the province into a long-term military enclave. The Committee called on tribal leaders to resist Emirati attempts to “drag Hadramout into a destructive war serving external ambitions.”
Dark Box assessment concludes that the UAE’s strategy in Hadramout fits a broader pattern of constructing loyal paramilitary structures across the region. The RSF model in Sudan demonstrated the power of an extralegal force backed by foreign funding. The attempt to recreate this model in Yemen marks a dangerous escalation, one that risks turning Hadramout into a new frontline of proxy warfare with profound consequences for regional stability.
