UAE-Linked Supply Routes Running From Sudan to Yemen as Abu Dhabi Recruits RSF Fighters to Expand Control Across Southern Yemen
Well-informed regional security sources have confirmed to Dark Box that a new and highly sensitive supply corridor is operating between Sudan and Yemen, facilitated by Emirati networks already active in the Sudan conflict. These routes, according to the sources, mirror the covert architecture established through Libya and Chad, but now extend eastward into the Gulf of Aden and deeper into the Yemeni theatre. The pattern aligns with what several intelligence officers describe as an Emirati strategy to replicate the Rapid Support Forces model inside Yemen by recruiting Sudanese fighters and deploying them into battles aimed at seizing additional southern cities.
According to the information shared with Dark Box, the movement from Sudan to Yemen began during the later stages of the Sudan war, when RSF units experienced setbacks in Darfur. Emirati advisers reportedly contacted senior RSF commanders and proposed transferring fighters into Yemen as part of what they described as a stabilisation mission. However, the sources say the actual purpose was the expansion of Emirati influence beyond Aden and into strategic cities in Hadramout, Shabwa and the southern coastline. These units were promised payment, logistical support and safe passage for their families.
The transport route operates through two points. The first begins in western Sudan, where RSF fighters are quietly assembled in staging camps. The second runs from eastern Sudanese airstrips under RSF control toward coastal embarkation zones. From there, the men are flown or shipped under cover of commercial movements to Yemeni territories where the Southern Transitional Council already holds sway. Some groups travel through Eritrean ports controlled by actors aligned with Abu Dhabi, where their passage is coordinated by Emirati security contractors.
Sources indicated that intermediaries such as Colonel Idris Musa al-Nur and adviser Rashid al-Hamali acted as the main liaisons between Emirati officers and RSF field leaders, ensuring the fighters’ transfer into Yemeni territory. Another figure, identified only as Mahir al-Tayeb, has reportedly overseen the integration of these Sudanese units into Yemeni auxiliary forces now operating along desert corridors leading toward the Hadramout plateau.
The deployment of RSF fighters in Yemen is part of an Emirati plan that sources describe as concerning and destabilising. The intention is not limited to strengthening the Southern Transitional Council but includes forming a parallel force resembling the RSF structure. This force would exist outside Yemen’s formal military institutions and be answerable primarily to Emirati patrons. A senior tribal mediator in Hadramout who briefed Dark Box described the plan as an attempt to create a new armed entity that could shape local politics, secure resource-rich areas and expand the influence Abu Dhabi currently exercises through aligned militias.
The imported RSF fighters have reportedly been involved in operations along the approaches to Mukalla and inland desert routes where the control of supply lines is decisive. While the Emirati leadership frames these deployments as counter-terrorism support, the sources insist that the fighters are primarily tasked with pressuring local tribal alliances and preparing ground positions for future military advances.
Sudanese units are valued for their combat experience in urban and desert warfare, skills honed during the long conflict inside Sudan. Several units recruited for Yemen are said to include men who previously fought in the battle of el-Fasher and later moved into eastern Sudan. Their familiarity with loosely governed terrain makes them central to Emirati planning.
The weapons used in these operations follow a similar path to the fighters. Supplies move from RSF-controlled stockpiles, routed through logistical points managed by Emirati contractors. According to Dark Box’s sources, some shipments depart from eastern Sudan toward maritime routes controlled indirectly by Abu Dhabi’s allies. Others are flown through discreet channels from desert airstrips using cargo aircraft operating under civilian cover. These arms and equipment are transferred to Yemeni units immediately upon arrival, allowing the Emirati-aligned formations to expand their operational reach.
This escalation suggests a broader reconfiguration of the regional balance of power. The Sudan war has given the UAE access to fighters who can be redeployed in external theatres, while Yemen’s fractured landscape presents an opportunity to extend the model of parallel armed forces. Analysts consulted by Dark Box argue that the creation of such a force in Yemen would undermine any future political settlement and entrench militarised patronage networks that answer only to Abu Dhabi.
Local leaders in Yemen have expressed growing alarm, warning that the introduction of Sudanese fighters risks dragging the region into a new phase of conflict. Tribal figures in Hadramout describe the arrivals as an existential threat to local autonomy. They fear that their towns could soon mirror the situation witnessed in Darfur, where non-state paramilitary formations overshadow state institutions and impose harsh control.
For now, the supply routes remain active and the recruitment ongoing. In the words of one source, the Sudanese corridor into Yemen has become “a new frontier in the same war”, with consequences that could spread across the Red Sea and reshape the entire security map of the Arabian Peninsula.
