New Espionage Scandal Revives Long-Standing Fears of Emirati Interference in Turkey
Dark Box has obtained sensitive information from Turkish security sources confirming that the recent detention of three suspected intelligence operatives has reopened unresolved questions about covert Emirati activity inside Turkey. Although the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s Office later retracted its own public statement linking the suspects to the United Arab Emirates, Dark Box sources insist that the sequence of events, coupled with Turkey’s recent history of counter-espionage operations, points to a deeper and familiar pattern.
According to the original statement issued by the prosecutor’s office, the suspects had allegedly been gathering confidential data on individuals working in critical Turkish state institutions. The operation was conducted through a Turkish phone number registered using false identities and used to probe the private information of personnel in foreign affairs, the defence sector and diplomatic missions inside Turkey. Investigators identified a group of four individuals who acquired a mobile line from a domestic operator and physically transported it outside the country to deliver it to an intelligence operative. Three suspects were arrested during a coordinated operation, while the fourth remained abroad.
What followed was highly unusual. Turkish officials contacted multiple media organisations and requested the removal of the reports. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor’s office issued a revised statement removing all references to Emirati involvement. A further clarification later in the evening insisted that the suspects had “no connection whatsoever” to the United Arab Emirates. The speed, pressure and contradictory language surrounding the retractions raise urgent questions about political sensitivity at the highest levels of the Turkish state.
To understand why the story shifted so quickly, it is necessary to revisit Turkey’s long and troubled history with Emirati covert influence. Although the two governments publicly reconciled in the period following the Arab uprisings, Ankara has repeatedly accused Abu Dhabi of sponsoring media networks, lobbying campaigns and clandestine operations aimed at weakening Turkey’s domestic and regional influence. Senior Turkish officials have previously claimed that Emirati intelligence channels attempted to cultivate anti-government figures inside Turkey and supported political actors involved in destabilising events.
The most serious allegation, still widely discussed within Turkish security circles, concerns the failed coup attempt in Ankara. Turkish officials have long maintained that the Emirates supported figures inside the network accused of orchestrating the attempted overthrow. Although these claims have never been publicly adjudicated in a court that directly names Abu Dhabi, Turkish leaders have referenced foreign support for the coup plotters on numerous occasions, with analysts repeatedly pointing to the Emirates as the likely state actor. Within Turkey’s intelligence community, the coup is often cited as the moment that crystallised the belief that the Emirates seeks not only to undermine Turkish leadership, but to do so through indirect, deniable and long-term mechanisms.
From Ankara’s perspective, the broader regional context also reinforces these suspicions. The Emirates views Turkish influence in Libya, Sudan and Syria as a strategic threat. In Libya, Turkey supports internationally recognised political actors and has training and advisory missions, whereas the Emirates has long backed rival factions. In Sudan, the Turkish government has increased cooperation with the Sudanese army at a time when the Emirates supports the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. In Syria, Ankara’s foothold in the north and its coordination with opposition groups stand in stark contrast to the Emirati policy of gradual re-engagement with Damascus. Analysts within Turkey believe that the Emirates seeks to limit Ankara’s influence across these arenas by keeping Turkey internally distracted, internationally isolated, and regionally constrained.
This strategic rivalry explains why Turkish officials often interpret suspected espionage cases involving Emirati nationals through a broader geopolitical lens. Whether the latest arrests are formally recognised as Emirati operations or not, they mirror methods previously attributed to Abu Dhabi: the use of false digital identities, attempts to map political and bureaucratic networks, and efforts to track figures in foreign affairs, defence and diplomatic circles.
Turkey’s decision to publicly retract the original allegations may reflect a more pragmatic calculation. The two governments have recently signed major trade and investment agreements, and officials from both sides have repeatedly emphasised their desire to isolate areas of dispute rather than allow them to poison the entire relationship. The need for economic stability, combined with the fragile recovery of Turkey’s currency, may have encouraged Ankara to de-escalate the incident rather than confront it openly.
However, within Turkish security agencies, the event is unlikely to be dismissed. Turkey has arrested numerous suspects linked to Israeli, Russian and Iranian intelligence services in recent years, and investigators view foreign espionage as an expanding threat. The circumstances surrounding the quick deletion of the initial press release suggest an internal tug-of-war between security imperatives and diplomatic caution.
For now, the unanswered question remains whether the latest arrests are an isolated operation or part of a longer continuum of covert attempts to penetrate Turkish institutions. Dark Box will continue to investigate the evolving story, the political pressures surrounding it, and the deeper pattern of interference shaping relations between Ankara and Abu Dhabi.
