UAE-Linked Companies Sanctioned for Supporting the Houthis, the RSF, or Haftar

Dark Box investigation based on leaked designation files and corporate trail documents spanning two thousand fifteen through two thousand twenty six

Well-informed sources have confirmed to Dark Box that a core contradiction sits at the heart of Abu Dhabi’s regional posture: the UAE publicly markets itself as a bulwark against the Houthis, yet leaked sanction files and investigative corporate records show Emirati-based entities repeatedly enabling the Houthis’ fuel economy, financing Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, and underwriting Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar’s war machine. The pattern, across multiple theatres, is not a handful of rogue traders. It is a repeatable method: front firms in free zones, maritime management shells, commodity laundering through Dubai, and deniable logistics that convert conflict into revenue.

The Houthi fuel pipeline that runs through the UAE

Dark Box reviewed leaked sanction dossiers tracing how fuel and refined petroleum reached Houthi-controlled Yemen through UAE corporate infrastructure. The clearest route in the files is a chain of oil traders and tanker managers operating from Dubai’s free zones and adjacent jurisdictions, coordinating the import and delivery of oil associated with Iranian supply networks into ports under Houthi control, especially Ras Isa.

Companies named in the leaked files include Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC and Arkan Mars Petroleum FZE, both described as coordinating shipments of oil to Yemen for Houthi benefit. The same document set maps a parallel shipping layer: Tyba Ship Management DMCC is described as operating tankers that delivered illicit oil cargoes to Houthi-held ports. Another cluster appears as financial and procurement cover, such as Adoon General Trading FZE, alleged to have facilitated laundering and import flows that moved funds toward Houthi structures, and Fani Oil Trading FZE, described as purchasing and shipping gasoline linked to a wider fuel network whose proceeds strengthened Houthi finances.

Additional files identify Al Foulk General Trading LLC as linked to a financier network used to funnel money into Yemen, while Indo Gulf Ship Management LLC appears in maritime records as a fleet manager for vessels transporting large volumes of fuel oil tied to the same Houthi-benefiting supply chain. Eco Max Trading FZE and Eco Max FZE are described as shell ownership and operational nodes, managing tankers used in fuel deliveries and sustaining a repeatable maritime scheme built on layered ownership, management contracts, and deniable routing.

Two shipping managers, Safe Seas Ship Management FZE and Aurum Ship Management FZC, appear in the leaked files as examples of how “clean” maritime services can become the operational backbone of sanctions evasion. Dark Box sources say the commercial logic is straightforward: every delivery generates fees, commissions, and leverage, while the political cost is diffused through corporate opacity.

The implication is devastating for the UAE’s messaging. Abu Dhabi positions itself as confronting the Houthis, yet these records show Emirati corporate vehicles repeatedly providing the Houthis the commodity most essential to war governance: fuel. Fuel sustains transportation, taxation, patronage networks, and the coercive capacity of any armed authority. In practical terms, the Houthis do not only survive on ideology and missiles. They survive on diesel, gasoline, and the commercial systems that keep them flowing.

RSF financing through Dubai’s gold and procurement ecosystem

Dark Box sources also confirm that Emirati-based trading entities formed a financial backbone for the RSF’s war economy in Sudan. Leaked designation files highlight procurement fronts that sourced vehicles and equipment for RSF forces, and gold-linked firms that monetised Sudanese resources through Dubai.

Tradive General Trading LLC is described as a procurement front acquiring vehicles, including militarised pickups, for RSF use. A larger constellation is attributed to the Capital Tap network: Capital Tap Holding LLC, Capital Tap Management Consultancies LLC, and Capital Tap General Trading LLC appear in the same tranche of files as interlocking entities used to funnel funds and facilitate RSF-linked business operations. Creative Python LLC is described as a cut-out company used to conceal business transactions tied to RSF leadership.

The gold node is equally central. Al Zumoroud and Al Yaqoot Gold and Jewellers LLC, referenced as AZ Gold, is described as purchasing Sudanese gold on behalf of RSF-linked interests and shipping it into Dubai, converting conflict-zone extraction into hard currency. Al Jil Al Qadem General Trading LLC and Horizon Advanced Solutions General Trading LLC appear as additional conduits, with the latter described as importing sensitive equipment through supply chains connected to RSF-linked operators.

What emerges is a war economy model with two UAE pillars: procurement that equips fighters and commodity laundering that pays them. Dark Box sources say this is why the RSF can endure battlefield shocks. Revenue streams are externalised into markets where liquidity is abundant and scrutiny is fragmented.

Haftar’s support architecture and the private military layer

The Libyan track in Dark Box’s leaked materials centres on private security and logistics companies operating from the UAE that were tied to mercenary support and advanced capabilities for Haftar’s forces. Lancaster6 DMCC and Opus Capital Asset Ltd FZE appear as key corporate shells linked to a mercenary operation described in internal records as a package of aviation assets, drones, and cyber capabilities intended to support Haftar’s campaign.

A separate manpower pipeline appears in files concerning Black Shield Security Services in Abu Dhabi, described as recruiting Sudanese men under the cover of security work and routing them into Libya as armed guards and fighters, including around critical energy sites. Dark Box sources stress that this model turns labour recruitment into a military logistics function, again maximising deniability while sustaining coercive power on the ground.

The method behind the map

Across Yemen, Sudan, and Libya, Dark Box findings point to a consistent blueprint. Free-zone entities provide fast incorporation and opaque ownership. General trading labels mask specialised procurement. Ship management firms transform maritime services into covert logistics. Gold and fuel convert war into cash. The UAE then benefits twice: commercially through fees and access, and politically through proxy leverage, while retaining the option to deny state involvement.

Dark Box concludes that the most consequential deception is not rhetorical. It is structural. Abu Dhabi can claim confrontation with the Houthis while Emirati-based entities keep the Houthi fuel economy alive. That contradiction does not merely undermine credibility. It prolongs wars, enriches networks built on instability, and entrenches a regional marketplace where conflict is treated as a business model rather than a catastrophe.