The Red Sea Chessboard: Egypt and Saudi Arabia Seek Eritrea to Undermine UAE Ambitions

Dark Box has received information indicating that Egypt and Saudi Arabia are increasingly converging on Eritrea as a strategic pressure point in a widening regional contest aimed at blocking the United Arab Emirates from consolidating deeper military and political ties with Ethiopia. According to well-informed regional sources, this quiet but deliberate shift reflects growing alarm in Cairo and Riyadh over Abu Dhabi’s expanding footprint in the Horn of Africa and its implications for Sudan, the Red Sea, and broader Arab security.

Eritrea, long perceived as an insular and unpredictable state, has re-emerged as a critical actor in this struggle precisely because of its geography. Sitting astride vital Red Sea shipping lanes and bordering both Sudan and Ethiopia, Eritrea has become a potential linchpin in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Dark Box understands that Egyptian decision-makers now view Asmara not as a marginal player, but as a necessary counterweight to Emirati-backed arrangements unfolding in Addis Ababa.

Sources indicate that Egypt has been actively working to broker stronger security ties between Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. This effort is not symbolic. It is driven by concrete strategic calculations shaped by the war in Sudan and by a defence arrangement recently concluded between Sudan’s military leadership and Pakistan, an agreement widely understood within regional security circles to be underwritten by Saudi financing. While the weapons linked to that deal have not yet appeared on the battlefield, its political impact has been immediate. It has encouraged Cairo to explore broader alignments that could curb Emirati leverage over supply routes and proxy forces in the region.

At one point, both Egypt and Eritrea were regarded as relatively close to Abu Dhabi. That alignment has frayed. Relations between Cairo and the UAE have become strained over the trajectory of the Sudan conflict and differing positions on Gaza. Eritrea’s relationship with the Emirates has also cooled significantly since Abu Dhabi dismantled its military base at the Red Sea port of Assab and redirected its strategic focus toward Ethiopia, Eritrea’s historic rival.

For Egyptian planners, this shift set off alarm bells. Ethiopia’s growing security cooperation with the UAE intersects directly with Cairo’s most sensitive national security concern: control of Nile waters. The inauguration of Ethiopia’s massive dam project has already heightened tensions, and Emirati backing for Addis Ababa only deepens Egyptian fears of encirclement. Supporting Eritrea, therefore, serves multiple Egyptian objectives at once. It pressures Ethiopia, complicates Emirati logistics, and reinforces Cairo’s position along the Red Sea corridor.

However, Egypt’s role is constrained by economics. Eritrea’s leadership, while adept at political maneuvering, governs a country with limited financial resources. Asmara’s economy relies on a narrow base, and its military has been stretched by years of conflict. Dark Box sources say this is where Saudi Arabia becomes indispensable. Riyadh’s financial capacity makes it the only actor capable of underwriting Eritrea’s security needs at the scale required to offset Emirati influence.

Importantly, Eritrea does not need heavy persuasion to move closer to Saudi Arabia. According to regional insiders, Asmara has quietly sought stronger ties with Riyadh for some time. President Isaias Afwerki, who has ruled Eritrea since independence, is known for his transactional approach to alliances and his ability to navigate between competing regional axes. During a recent extended visit to Saudi Arabia, Afwerki reportedly discussed expanding security cooperation, signaling a readiness to reposition Eritrea more firmly within a Saudi-Egyptian orbit.

This realignment also reflects renewed friction between Eritrea and Ethiopia. After a period of rapprochement that followed the end of their border war, relations have deteriorated once again. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of backing rebel groups, while Eritrean officials remain deeply wary of Ethiopian military capabilities, particularly the growing use of drones. Dark Box understands that concerns over Ethiopian air power are a major driver behind Eritrea’s search for new security partners.

The broader context is a visible fragmentation of Gulf unity. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, once closely aligned, now support opposing sides in key regional conflicts, most notably in Sudan and Yemen. The rupture became public after Saudi lobbying efforts in Washington targeted Emirati policy in Sudan, a move that underscored how far relations have deteriorated. In this environment, Eritrea has become one of several pressure points where Riyadh and Cairo believe Emirati ambitions can be checked.

Yet challenges remain. While political alignment is taking shape, translating it into concrete military and financial commitments will not be straightforward. Saudi Arabia faces its own domestic economic pressures and has shown caution in fully bankrolling external security arrangements. The Sudan Pakistan defence deal itself illustrates these limits, as promised support has yet to materialize on the ground.

For now, Eritrea represents a strategic opening rather than a settled alliance. Dark Box sources suggest that Cairo and Riyadh see Asmara as a gap that must be filled before Abu Dhabi can fully exploit its partnership with Ethiopia. Whether this emerging axis can deliver tangible results will depend on sustained Saudi engagement and Eritrea’s willingness to commit decisively to one camp in an increasingly polarized regional landscape.