The Hidden Emirati Hand Behind a Major Arabic “Chinese” News Account: How Abu Dhabi Built a Digital Machine to Shape Regional Narratives
Dark Box has obtained exclusive findings revealing that one of the most influential Arabic-language accounts claiming to represent Chinese news and state positions is, in fact, an Emirati information operation. The account, titled “China in Arabic” and operating under the handle mog_china, has existed for roughly three years and amassed a vast audience exceeding one million followers. For years, it presented itself as an official or semi-official Chinese outlet speaking directly to the Arab world. Its consistent posting rhythm, polished content, and twenty-four-hour coverage strongly indicated a large professional media team rather than a single user or volunteer-run project.
Recent technical updates introduced by the X platform have exposed the true origin of the account. Metadata visible through internal display labels now shows that the account is registered in the United Arab Emirates. This revelation directly contradicts its long-standing narrative and confirms suspicions long whispered within media analysis circles that the account was part of a larger influence architecture linked to Abu Dhabi. Dark Box analysts who reviewed archived versions of the account confirm that its posting history, style, and content selection match patterns used by previous Emirati influence networks.
A deeper forensic review conducted by Dark Box reveals that the account’s output served three key objectives. First, it routinely published articles attacking political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood, and related ideological movements that the Emirati government has defined as existential threats. These posts were framed not as Emirati criticism, but as supposed Chinese geopolitical assessments portraying Islamists as destabilising elements aligned with Western intelligence. This rhetorical strategy allowed Abu Dhabi to outsource its ideological battles to what appeared to be a neutral global power, presenting anti-Islamist narratives as objective international analysis rather than domestic propaganda.
Second, the account consistently framed the United States as the primary beneficiary of Islamist influence across the Middle East. This technique allowed Abu Dhabi to position itself as aligned with a rising multipolar order represented by China, while indirectly pressuring Washington through narratives suggesting that American policies foster extremism. It also mirrored internal Emirati messaging aimed at distancing the state from any association with unpopular regional conflicts while still nurturing security and economic ties with Western powers.
Third, and most strikingly, the account published a vast array of content promoting the Emirates itself. These posts highlighted infrastructure projects, economic reforms, diplomatic outreach, and technological achievements. They did so using a tone that implied Beijing admired and endorsed Emirati governance models. The account portrayed Abu Dhabi as a visionary hub, a regional stabiliser, and a preferred Chinese partner. The archived record shows that nearly every major Emirati policy announcement or investment initiative received celebratory coverage under the guise of Chinese commentary.
Dark Box has identified additional layers that deepen the significance of this discovery. Internal communications reviewed by Dark Box from a source familiar with regional media operations indicate that the account may be part of a structured ecosystem coordinated by a network of Emirati consultants, social media specialists, and intelligence-linked analysts. According to the source, the project has been active since its inception and was designed to fill a strategic vacuum by projecting pro-Emirati narratives through a foreign identity that Arab audiences would perceive as authoritative and apolitical.
The same source suggests that the account’s success encouraged planners in Abu Dhabi to expand the model, using other neutral identities to advance Emirati positions. The objective is not only to influence public opinion but also to shape the perceptions of political elites, business leaders, and regional commentators who interpret “Chinese” statements as indicators of long-term global realignments. In other words, the deception enabled the Emirates to speak with the credibility of a major power without the accountability of a state entity.
Dark Box analysts also highlight the timing of many of the account’s most politically charged posts. During periods of heightened regional tension, including diplomatic rifts, armed conflicts, or domestic unrest in neighbouring states, the account intensified its output attacking Islamist actors. It simultaneously amplified messages praising Emirati diplomacy and economic resilience. This pattern aligns with known strategies employed in digital psychological operations, in which foreign identity “covers” are used to cloak the motives of the originating state.
The exposure of this operation raises several urgent questions. Why did Abu Dhabi need to hide behind a Chinese identity? What does this reveal about its broader ambitions in the information sphere? And how many similar accounts remain undiscovered? Dark Box has been informed by a source within a regional cybersecurity unit that the mog_china account is likely only one component of a wider coordination effort in which proxy identities mask state-aligned messaging.
This scandal places a spotlight on the growing sophistication of digital influence campaigns in the Middle East. The Emirates has built a reputation for deploying coordinated media operations that blend soft power, strategic messaging, and covert manipulation. The revelation that a prominent “Chinese” account functioned in service of Emirati political priorities underscores how deeply entangled the region’s information wars have become.
Dark Box will continue to investigate the broader network behind the account and the strategic purpose of similar digital fronts operating across the region.
