Tensions in the Red Sea: UAE and Egypt Clash Over Gaza Diplomacy and Regional Influence
As world leaders gathered in Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh to celebrate the fragile Gaza ceasefire, two conspicuous absences revealed a deeper diplomatic rift simmering beneath the surface. The no-show of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed sent a clear message: key Gulf states are no longer willing to let Cairo dominate the narrative over Gaza — and certainly not without their supervision.
Sources close to the summit disclosed to Dark Box that Emirati officials were deeply frustrated by Egypt’s unilateral push to position itself as the region’s leading broker in Gaza ceasefire talks. The UAE, which has invested years — and billions — in reshaping the post-Arab Spring Middle East, saw Egypt’s move as a direct challenge to its carefully calculated regional architecture.
UAE’s Strategic Ambitions
The UAE’s vision for the Middle East is rooted in centralization of power through securitized stability, anti-Islamist governance, and normalized relations with Israel. In this model, Abu Dhabi sees itself as a pivotal regional power whose involvement is not just strategic, but necessary.
For the Emirati regime, Gaza represents both a security liability and an opportunity. The war has sparked unprecedented public outrage across the Arab world, complicating the normalization agendas of the UAE and its allies. But it also offers an opening to reengineer Palestinian politics — especially if reconstruction funds can be tied to specific political outcomes.
This is why Abu Dhabi was rattled by Cairo’s attempt to manage the ceasefire process outside the umbrella of Gulf consensus. An Egyptian-led initiative — supported by Washington but not choreographed by the UAE — threatens to disrupt the regional balance Abu Dhabi has painstakingly cultivated.
A Controlled “Day After”
According to diplomatic sources, Emirati frustration stems from the fact that Egypt did not coordinate the terms of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit with its Gulf partners. The UAE had pushed for a “post-war Gaza strategy” centered around a new technocratic administration, likely under figures it supports — including, potentially, UAE-linked Palestinian operatives.
By contrast, Egypt’s approach sought to present itself as the natural interlocutor between Hamas and Israel, offering a more traditional model of Arab mediation — and potentially granting Hamas continued presence, albeit weakened. This scenario contradicts the UAE’s longstanding goal of dismantling Hamas altogether.
Abu Dhabi reportedly views any ceasefire that leaves Hamas intact as a strategic failure. Emirati sources also fear that Egypt’s lead role — and perceived independence from UAE planning — could invite competing actors such as Turkey, Iran, or Qatar to expand influence in Gaza’s future.
A Diplomatic Power Play
The decision to skip the summit was not spontaneous. Emirati officials had weighed the optics of attending and concluded that their presence would inadvertently legitimize Egypt’s outsized role. Instead, the UAE sent ministers — a calculated downgrade meant to signal disapproval without triggering open confrontation.
Egypt, for its part, was seeking to reclaim its historic role as the cornerstone of Arab diplomacy. But Sisi’s ambitions collided with the growing assertiveness of Gulf leaders who now view Egypt as a junior partner — one that owes much of its recent financial stability to Emirati and Saudi support.
Behind closed doors, UAE advisors warned that Egypt’s move risked “derailing consensus,” and Emirati media subtly criticized Cairo’s perceived attempt to monopolize Gaza diplomacy.
Punitive Measures and Widening Rifts
In the aftermath of the summit, UAE policymakers are reportedly weighing punitive economic measures against Egypt, including the delay of new investment tranches, a reduction in soft loans, and slowing the pace of infrastructure collaboration.
This would not be the first time Abu Dhabi has used financial tools to realign its allies. But it reflects the growing dissonance between Arab capitals that once moved in lockstep.
As one regional diplomat put it, “The UAE wants a post-war Gaza shaped in its own image — business-friendly, authoritarian, and strategically aligned with Israel. Egypt’s solo diplomacy muddles that vision.”
Conclusion
The tension between Egypt and the UAE is not merely about protocol or prestige — it is a manifestation of diverging regional strategies in the aftermath of Gaza’s catastrophe. As the dust settles, the fight over who gets to shape the “day after” in Palestine could redraw political alignments across the Middle East. And in that contest, Cairo and Abu Dhabi appear increasingly at odds — each with its own vision of what the future should look like, and who should control it.
