UAE Keeps the US Close While Quietly Hedging Against It, Seeking China as a Strategic Alternative Amid Isolation in the Gulf
Well-informed diplomatic and intelligence sources have confirmed to Dark Box that the United Arab Emirates is pursuing a dual-track foreign policy designed to preserve surface-level closeness with the United States while simultaneously building strategic depth with China, particularly in light of Washington’s reinvigorated alliances with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. According to these sources, Abu Dhabi now finds itself more isolated within the Gulf than at any point in the past decade, and is turning to Beijing and secondary conflict theatres such as Sudan and Yemen to compensate for declining influence in Washington.
The sources describe the UAE’s approach as an anxious recalibration rather than a position of strength. In internal assessments shared with Dark Box, senior Emirati officials expressed concern that Washington’s renewed intimacy with Riyadh under President Trump, and its growing reliance on Doha’s mediation diplomacy, have pushed Abu Dhabi to the margins. The UAE’s previous leverage, built on exclusive security partnerships and privileged access to US decision-makers, is fading, leaving the leadership searching for alternative frameworks to avoid strategic irrelevance.
Despite this shift, the UAE continues to maintain public alignment with the United States, especially in areas such as counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence exchanges. However, sources close to US policy circles told Dark Box that Washington now views Abu Dhabi as a “managed partner rather than a preferred partner,” a distinction that reflects eroding trust after Emirati manoeuvres in Sudan and Yemen contradicted US regional priorities.
The Sudan war remains the most consequential point of divergence. While Washington and Riyadh pushed for de-escalation and political negotiation, the UAE supported the Rapid Support Forces, enabling the paramilitary group’s expansion through a regional network extending from Libya and Chad to Somalia. These actions, confirmed through multiple intelligence channels, frustrated US diplomatic plans and annoyed Saudi leaders who saw the Sudan conflict threatening Red Sea stability. Sources indicate that Washington communicated its displeasure privately, noting that Emirati behaviour risked undermining broader US objectives in the Horn of Africa.
Yet, according to Dark Box’s sources, Abu Dhabi calculated that the United States would not meaningfully penalise it for the RSF issue, given Washington’s priority of maintaining unity among its Middle Eastern allies against Iran and non-state threats. This calculation proved correct: despite repeated concerns voiced by senior US officials, the relationship remained intact. However, the stability of the relationship has not restored the UAE’s previous privileged position, creating a sense of strategic insecurity in Abu Dhabi.
A similar pattern is visible in Yemen, where Emirati attempts to reshape the south through proxy militias, including plans to replicate RSF-style structures in Hadramout, placed it at odds with both US and Saudi goals. While the United States supported de-escalation and Yemeni institutional consolidation, the UAE pursued fragmentation, backing groups whose ambitions contradicted Riyadh’s vision for a unified Yemeni front. Diplomats who spoke to Dark Box noted that Washington views these policies as destabilising, even if it avoids public confrontation.
These disagreements have not triggered a rupture, but they have contributed to the UAE’s growing sense of isolation. As Saudi Arabia and Qatar strengthen their positions within Washington, the UAE finds its influence overshadowed. Qatar’s centrality in US diplomacy, especially after its ongoing role in hostage negotiations and de-escalation talks, has elevated Doha’s status. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has regained a degree of favour through strategic alignment on energy, security and regional stabilisation agendas.
In this environment, the UAE has turned increasingly toward China as a hedge. Chinese intelligence, commercial and military footprints inside Emirati territory have grown steadily, even as Abu Dhabi publicly insists its partnership with the United States remains its cornerstone. The controversy around Zayed Military City, where US officials suspected the presence of Chinese military personnel, exemplifies the tension. Sources confirm that Washington’s inability to access parts of the facility raised significant alarm. Although the incident did not damage the relationship outright, it reinforced perceptions in Washington that the UAE was drifting.
For Abu Dhabi, alignment with China provides a counterweight to Gulf marginalisation. Beijing offers investment, technological cooperation and political cover without demanding ideological alignment or transparency. The UAE sees Chinese partnership as insurance in case US commitments weaken or its alliances with Saudi Arabia and Qatar further eclipse Emirati influence. Yet this strategy also deepens the perception in Washington that the UAE is no longer a fully dependable ally.
The result is a contradictory posture: a state seeking to appear indispensable to Washington while simultaneously behaving as though it expects abandonment. Sources describe internal discussions in Abu Dhabi as defensive, shaped by fears of regional sidelining. Rather than projecting strength, the UAE’s recent actions reveal insecurity, uncertainty and a scramble to avoid becoming peripheral in a Gulf order increasingly defined by Saudi-US-Qatari coordination.
Abu Dhabi keeps the United States close because it must. It courts China because it fears being left behind. And it pursues risky adventures in Sudan and Yemen because it seeks relevance at a moment when its regional standing is no longer guaranteed.
