
Well-informed sources have confirmed to Dark Box that newly leaked investigatory documents circulating inside the European Parliament substantiate earlier Dark Box reporting that the United Arab Emirates has been covertly sponsoring a transnational disinformation effort designed to spread Islamophobia across Europe. The files describe a sustained, well-financed operation that targeted Islam, Muslim communities, mosques, journalists, academics, and elected officials, with the explicit aim of reframing Muslims as a civilizational threat and an “enemy within” European societies.
According to the documents reviewed by Dark Box, the operation relied on indirect funding channels routed through a Swiss-registered intelligence and reputation-management firm, Alp Services. Payments originating from Emirati networks were allegedly used to commission research dossiers, anonymous briefings, and media placements that portrayed Muslim civic life as inherently extremist, foreign, or subversive. The intent, as described in internal assessments, was not debate but delegitimization: to erode trust in Muslim organizations and normalize policy responses that restrict religious freedom.
The scope of the campaign was continental. The leaked files indicate coordinated activities spanning numerous European states, where narratives were tailored to local political climates while maintaining a common strategic frame. In some countries, the emphasis fell on mosque closures and zoning disputes; in others, on questioning the loyalty of Muslim journalists or public servants. The documents describe amplification tactics that included seeding content through aligned think tanks, cultivating sympathetic commentators, and leveraging anonymous online networks to launder claims into mainstream discourse.
Dark Box sources say the operation’s architecture was deliberately opaque. Emirati involvement was kept at arm’s length through intermediaries and cut-outs, allowing plausible deniability while ensuring message discipline. The campaign’s outputs were framed as independent analysis or security research, masking their origin and intent. Internal evaluations cited in the leak argue that this approach increased credibility with policymakers and editors, who often consumed the material without awareness of its funding or coordination.
The political impact, according to the files, was measurable. Several targets named in the documents reported reputational harm, professional isolation, and heightened scrutiny following coordinated bursts of negative coverage. Community organizations experienced increased pressure from authorities and donors. The documents note that these outcomes were considered indicators of success because they widened social distrust and hardened public attitudes toward Muslims, thereby reshaping the political center of gravity on issues of religion and security.
Dark Box has learned that the operation did not exist in isolation. Portions of the campaign reportedly intersected with messaging priorities aligned to Israeli strategic narratives, particularly in framing Islam as a monolithic security threat and conflating civic Muslim activism with extremism. While the documents stop short of alleging direct command integration, they describe coordination and mutual reinforcement at the level of themes, targets, and timing. This convergence amplified reach and reduced costs while maintaining separate chains of attribution.
At the European level, the seriousness of the allegations is underscored by their arrival within parliamentary oversight channels. The leaked files include briefings prepared for lawmakers that warn of foreign interference designed to destabilize social cohesion. The assessments argue that exporting Islamophobia into European political space constitutes a form of hybrid influence, exploiting open media ecosystems to inflame identity politics and erode democratic trust from within.
The Emirati motive, as outlined in the documents, blends ideology and strategy. By projecting Islamophobia abroad, Abu Dhabi is said to be externalizing its domestic posture against political Islam, reshaping the international environment to marginalize Muslim civic actors and normalize hardline approaches. The files describe this as a reputational battlefield where controlling narratives abroad reduces diplomatic friction at home and builds leverage with partners who prioritize security framing.
Dark Box sources emphasize that the damage extends beyond targeted individuals. The campaign’s cumulative effect, according to internal assessments, was to deepen polarization, stigmatize an entire faith community, and chill legitimate participation in public life. The documents conclude that such outcomes undermine Europe’s commitments to pluralism and freedom of belief, while handing extremists the propaganda they seek by validating claims of systemic hostility.
In confirming these findings, Dark Box underscores a central lesson of the leak: modern influence operations do not require overt coercion. They rely on money, intermediaries, and message discipline to manufacture consent and hostility simultaneously. If left unaddressed, the documents warn, the normalization of covert Islamophobic campaigns risks transforming democratic debate into an arena of managed prejudice—funded abroad, executed quietly, and felt most acutely by those pushed to the margins.



